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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
GAS GATHERING OR PENNY-PINCHING? 
BY I H McNICOLL AND I ORTON 
On 11 September 1981 the British Government finally announced the 
abandonment of its proposed North Sea gas-gathering pipeline scheme, thus 
ending one of the most complicated and controversial investment projects 
considered in the UK in recent years. The story of the pipeline is a 
fascinating one, offering insights into the present government's economic 
strategy generally and into its relationships with private enterprise 
specifically. 
The idea of a scheme to harness untapped gas resources from the North Sea is 
not a new one: as early as 1975 William Merz, a consultancy firm, were 
commissioned by the Department of Energy to assess the feasibility of a gas-
gathering pipeline system. It was not until July 1980, however, that a 
specific scheme proposed by British Gas-Mobil was adopted by the government. 
This scheme represented a massive investment programme: costing 
£2.7billion, the proposed pipeline was to be over 400 miles long and would 
carry gas from a dozen or more offshore fields to a landing point at St 
Fergus. Additional pipelines may also have been constructed onshore to 
distribute the gas and associated gas liquids. Economically the investment 
seemedanattractive proposition since the estimated additional 12 x 10 
cubic feet of gas reserves were conservatively valued at £25billion, and 
furthermore, fields which were marginal in terms of oil reserves alone, 
could become economically viable if gas were also extracted. Politically 
the project also appeared attractive since the new gas reserves would help 
ensure UK energy self-sufficiency into the 1990's and more immediately would 
answer criticisms of the wasteful flaring-off of gas from oil fields already 
in operation. When it is considered that the construction and operation of 
the pipeline would create thousands of jobs and the enlarged supply of gas 
liquids (especially ethane) could lead to the development of new 
petrochemical facilities, then the arguments in favour of the project seem 
overwhelming. Unfortunately where British governments are concerned the 
force of logical argument does not appear to be a major consideration in 
making decisions, and the present case proved to be no exception. 
Having proposed and promoted the gas-gathering scheme the Conservative 
government, in keeping with its general philosophy, insisted that the 
project be financed primarily privately by oil companies, gas users and 
financial institutions, with British Gas1 stake being limited to a maximum 
of 30%. In spite of efforts by various groups, such as that headed by the 
Bank of Scotland, insufficient (in the government's view) private funding 
was forthcoming, though it is understood that committed private monies 
amounted to over 50? of the total estimated project cost. Worse still, 
many potential private investors insisted on certain conditions being met 
prior to their involvement. The most important of these conditions 
referred to government underwriting of at least part of private risk 
capital, to increases in gas prices offered to suppliers and to downward 
adjustments in Petroleum Revenue Tax. Being dissatisfied with this 
response from private industry, the government briefly toyed with the idea 
of proceeding with the scheme initially funded 100% by British Gas before 
deciding to abandon the project completely. 
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At first sight the government's actions seem unexceptionable: if the gas-
gathering scheme could not attract private funds it would suggest that the 
project was uneconomic and, with projects like Concorde still fresh in the 
memory, the government would not wish to instigate any further 'lame ducks'. 
Furthermore, in the short to medium term government funding of the project 
could, ceteris paribus, increase the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) at a time when control of this variable is regarded as being of 
paramount importance. The PSBR consideration was also significant in 
leading to the rejection of any form of government guarantees and/or 
reductions in Petroleum Revenue Tax. 
Further analysis indicates that many of these reasons are overly simplistic, 
are frequently misguided, and in the worst instances appear to be little 
more than ex post rationalisation of political dogma. Firstly, the 
suggestion that gas supply can be determined privately in the market place 
ignores the fact that the demand for gas in the UK is, by law, entirely in 
the hands of a public monopoly, British Gas. British Gas have not 
hesitated to use this monopoly power to increase their own economic rent by 
restricting the price offered to its suppliers: currently British Gas are 
paying 5p - 16p per therm for offshore gas supplies while charging 29p per 
therm to their customers. Offshore operators argue that, to make the 
pipeline attractive from their viewpoint, a price of approximately 25p per 
them would be required. This price is comparable to that being paid for 
gas supplies in other EEC countries. To suggest that a situation where a 
public firm might control 30? of gas supply and 100? of gas demand remotely 
approximates a 'free market' situation is ridiculous. In such 
circumstances, and by their own principles, the government should have de-
monopolised gas demand or instructed British Gas to pay a price which 
allowed private investors to realise an internationally competitive rate of 
return. Secondly, while the government could not be expected to reduce oil 
tax to generate gas funding (for this would be a potentially dangerous 
precedent), the underlying concern of the offshore operators is of the 
history of numerous and unexpected changes in oil taxation. As recently as 
the last budget the imposition of Supplementary Petroleum Revenue Tax shook 
the offshore industry severely and may have rendered certain oil projects 
economically non-viable. For private investors, the undoubted technical 
risks associated with the gas-gathering scheme were compounded by fiscal 
risks aising from uncertainties surrounding the prevailing tax regime. 
Again, it is ironic that a government explicitly dedicated to providing 
incentives to private investment through tax reductions should be 
responsible for a tax system which, in the oil industry at least, appears to 
have quite the opposite effect. In summary, it cannot be concluded that 
the 'failure' of private enterprise to provide funding implied that the gas-
gathering scheme was non-economic for the private rate of return was, for 
reasons outlined above, likely to be considerably less than the project rate 
of return. 
If British Gas funded the entire project then, from the public sector's 
point of view, all the costs and revenues of the project can be internalised 
ie the project investment appraisal is appropriate in this case. Though a 
full cost/revenue profile for the gas-gathering scheme is not available to 
the authors, it seems clear that the project would have been highly 
profitable, with a payback period of 3-5 years. Additionally, since many 
of the thousands of new jobs created by the scheme would be filled from the 
ranks of the unemployed, the government could also count a substantial 
social security payment saving/tax revenue increase as a benefit from the 
project. If other non-monetary social benefits, such as the security of 
energy supplies, (would, one might ask, enhanced domestic energy supply be 
of greater real security value to the UK than even larger specifically 
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defence expenditures such as Trident?) are also considered, then it appears 
that the government would have been justified in funding the project on 
social cost/benefit grounds, particularly since alternative energy schemes 
such as nuclear power are less cost-effective (see Sir Martin Ryle, letter 
to the Times, 17/9/81). 
The only remaining government argument is that the financing of the project 
would have had a short-term adverse affect on the PSBR, though as has 
already been discussed this would have been partially offset by social 
security/income tax effects. It seems astonishing that a long-term project 
should be seriously affected by such considerations, thereby defeating the 
logic of investment appraisal. In addition, of course, once the gas 
started flowing government revenues would have increased substantially 
thereby reducing the PSBR, as oil is doing currently. 
It now appears that the oil companies will undertake the construction of a 
large scale gas-gathering scheme privately. The government will receive 
less revenue, net, since the cost of the scheme can now be offset against 
petroleum tax; British Gas will pay a higher price for the gas thereby 
reducing the economic rent accruing to the public sector and, with less 
incentive to buy construction materials domestically, UK employment creation 
may be reduced. Thankfully, however, the UK will now obtain the manifest 
benefits of increased gas supply. In these circumstances, one must ask why 
the government became involved in the first place. What have been the 
costs of delays, and how much has been spent on feasibility studies for the 
aborted scheme? More serious still is the apparent willingness of the 
present government to treat the short-term implications on the PSBR of long-
term projects as being of major importance in appraising the investment. 
Monetary discipline in the public sector is undoubtedly important, but to 
adopt a rigidly myopic view of public investment is the height of folly. 
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